# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

BRENDA U.,

Plaintiff,

 $\mathbf{V}_{\star}$ 

1:18-CV-918 (DJS)

ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

**APPEARANCES:** 

**OF COUNSEL:** 

KIRK AND TEFF, LLP Counsel for Plaintiff 10 Westbrook Lane P.O. Box 4466 Kingston, New York 12402

RALPH M. KIRK, ESQ. DREW CHISOLM, ESQ.

U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN.
OFFICE OF REG'L GEN. COUNSEL
REGION II
Counsel for Defendant
26 Federal Plaza - Room 3904
New York, NY 10278

MICHELLE L. CHRIST, ESQ.

DANIEL J. STEWART United States Magistrate Judge

## ORDER<sup>1</sup>

Plaintiff Brenda U., brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a decision by the Commissioner of Social Security that Plaintiff was not disabled. Dkt. No. 1. Currently before the Court is the Plaintiff's Motion for the Judgment on the Pleadings and the Commissioner of Social Security's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Dkt. Nos. 10 & 14. Oral argument was heard on the Motions on September 25, 2019 during an on the record telephone conference. Following argument, I issued a bench decision in which, after applying the governing legal standards, I found the Commissioner's determination failed to provide a sufficient explanation for its consideration of medical opinions in the record.

After due deliberation and based upon the Court's bench decision, which has been transcribed, is attached to this order, and is incorporated by reference herein, it is hereby

**ORDERED**, that Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is **GRANTED**; and it is further

**ORDERED**, that Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is **DENIED**; and it is further

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Upon Plaintiff's consent, the United States' general consent, and in accordance with this District's General Order 18, this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. See Dkt. No. 7 & General Order 18.

ORDERED, that Defendant's decision denying Plaintiff disability benefits is VACATED and REMANDED pursuant to Sentence Four of section 405(g) for further proceedings; and it is further

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Order on the parties.

Dated: September 25, 2019 Albany, New York

Daniel J. Stewart,

U.S. Magistrate Judge

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	
4	BRENDA U.,
5	Plaintiff, CASE NO. 1:18-CV-918
6	vs.
7	COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
8	Defendant.
9	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
10	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HON. DANIEL J. STEWART
11	WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2019 ALBANY, NEW YORK
12	
13	FOR THE PLAINTIFF:  Kirk & Teff, LLP
14	By: Drew Chisholm, Esq. 10 Westbrook Lane, PO Box 4466
15	Kingston, New York 12402
16	
17	FOR THE DEFENDANT: Social Security Administration
18	By: Michelle L. Christ, Esq. 26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904
19	New York, New York 10278
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	THERESA J. CASAL, RPR, CRR, CSR Federal Official Court Reporter
25	445 Broadway, Room 509 Albany, New York 12207

THE COURT: At this point in time, I am prepared to render a decision on this matter, so from this point forward, the transcript will be the decision and the decision is as follows:

This is an action pursuant to 42, United States

Code, Section 405(g), seeking judicial review of an adverse

determination of the Social Security Administration. Having

reviewed the record and the briefs filed by the parties and

hearing the arguments of Counsel this morning, I'm prepared

to issue a ruling on the pending motions for judgment on the

pleadings.

Plaintiff initially filed for supplemental security income benefits in February of 2015. Her claim was denied and she then requested and had a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge. The ALJ issued a decision on July 3, 2017, finding that plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and thus not entitled to benefits. The Social Security Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the defendant. It is that decision the plaintiff seeks to review in this action.

Plaintiff was born in 1966. She alleges a disability onset date of June 10, 2005. She claimed disability based upon a number of conditions, including degenerative joint disease, arthritis, bone disease and

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

2.3

24

25

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease or COPD. She has past relevant work as a cashier and cleaner. She has an established history of drug addiction.

The ALJ's decision applied the established sequential analysis for evaluating claims of this nature. In his decision, the ALJ found the plaintiff had the following severe impairments: Degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, lumbar disc bulges and COPD. The ALJ next found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equals one of the listed impairments in the Social Security Administration's regulations. The ALJ then found that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of light work, except that she could not work at jobs with a concentrated exposure to airborne irritants. The ALJ found that plaintiff could perform her past relevant work and that there were other jobs that she could perform consistent with her functional capacity. As a result, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled and not entitled to benefits.

Among the evidence in the administrative record is a medical source statement from Dr. Ravi Ramaswami, plaintiff's treating physician, which found, among other things, that the plaintiff suffered from cervical disc disease and, as a result, was significantly limited in her

functional abilities. Dr. Ramaswami found, for example, that plaintiff could walk only a half of a city block without rest or severe pain, could stand for no more than ten minutes without needing to sit down or walk around, could sit or stand for no less than two hours during an eight-hour workday, would need to frequently take unscheduled breaks from work, could never lift 10 pounds or more, would be off task 25 percent or more of the time and would likely be absent four or more days per month as a result of her limitations.

The ALJ's decision concluded that Dr. Ramaswami's medical source statement was entitled only to little weight. One of the plaintiff's principle arguments here is that in affording the opinion little weight, the ALJ did not properly evaluate this medical opinion. Under Social Security Administration regulations, a treating physician's opinion as to the nature and severity of the claimant's impairment is entitled to controlling weight when it is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the case record. However, there are situations where the treating physician's opinion is not entitled to controlling weight. In such circumstances, the Second Circuit's decision in *Greek versus Colvin* makes clear that the ALJ must explicitly consider the frequency, length,

2.1

nature and extent of treatment; the amount of medical evidence supporting the opinion; the consistency of the opinion with the remaining medical evidence; and whether the physician is a specialist.

In this case, while recognizing that Dr. Ramaswami was a treating source, the ALJ nonetheless afforded his opinion only little weight. In doing so, however, the ALJ did not provide the type of explanation required by the regulations as explained in the relevant case law. The ALJ did generally refer to the length of this doctor's treatment of plaintiff by citing to plaintiff's treatment records. The ALJ's decision, however, involved no discussion of the frequency, nature and extent of treatment.

with regard to the support for Dr. Ramaswami's opinion in his own records, the ALJ made a largely conclusory finding that, quote, all the claimant's physical examinations from February of 2015 to March of 2017 were normal, unquote, and thus not consistent with the limitations suggested by her doctor. While it may be that the ALJ could have justified this conclusion with more explanation, the reasoning provided by the ALJ leaves the Court uncertain as to whether the appropriate analysis was conducted. As plaintiff points out, she was repeatedly characterized as appearing malnourished and frail during her appointments with Dr. Ramaswami. Plaintiff also presented

1.0

1.7

2.2

2.4

to Dr. Ramaswami on multiple occasions with back, neck and shoulder pain. At or near the time of his medical source statement, plaintiff's doctor noted that back and neck pain was making it such that plaintiff could not stand for more than a few minutes. These findings are at least somewhat consistent with the limits imposed by Dr. Ramaswami's medical source statement.

The ALJ also did not offer any explanation regarding the consistency of Dr. Ramaswami's opinions with other medical evidence in the record. The failure to discuss whether this opinion was consistent with other evidence in the record is problematic because, as plaintiff points out, there was other evidence in the record consistent with Dr. Ramaswami's opinion. The ALJ, for example, recognized that an MRI revealed degenerative changes in bulging discs and stenosis. He also recognized plaintiff's treatment for back and neck pain both at the Spine Institute of Columbia Memorial Hospital and through a course of physical therapy. But the ALJ makes no reference to this evidence when articulating his ground for discounting the opinion of plaintiff's treating physician.

To justify affording the opinion reduced weight, defendant points out that many of Dr. Ramaswami's medical notes reveal that during his examinations of plaintiff, the doctor rarely seems to have evaluated plaintiff's

2.1

1 23

2.4

musculoskeletal system. Defendant also points out that plaintiff's appointments during this time period were largely assessing plaintiff for refills of suboxone to treat her opioid addiction, not to assess pain or other medical conditions that related to the opinions provided in the medical source statement.

Defendant appears to be correct on both points and both may have been appropriate grounds for providing less weight to the opinion, but neither was relied upon by the ALJ as a basis for discounting Dr. Ramaswami's opinion, and courts have consistently held that defendant's after-the-fact justification for doing so is not entitled to weight. See, for example, Snell versus Apfel, Second Circuit decision from 1999, and Crosse versus Colvin, a 2014 decision from the Northern District of New York.

Without a more thorough explanation of the ALJ's reasoning for finding the medical source statement inconsistent with the treatment notes and other evidence in the record, the Court concludes that the matter should be remanded for further consideration of the proper weight to be afforded this opinion.

The plaintiff makes a number of additional arguments concerning the ALJ's evaluation of the record and the RFC determination. Given that the amount of weight that might be afforded the plaintiff's treating physician on

remand will necessarily have a significant impact on any further RFC finding, the Court finds that the other issues raised should be addressed by the ALJ following reconsideration of the treating physician's opinion.

As a result, I grant plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, deny defendant's motion and remand the matter pursuant to sentence 4 of Section 405(g) for further proceedings.

All right. Anything further that counsel wishes me to address before we end this conference?

MR. CHISHOLM: No. No, thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Miss Christ, anything further?

MS. CHRIST: No, thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you both. I appreciate it.

MS. CHRIST: Thank you.

MR. CHISHOLM: Thank you.

(This matter adjourned at 10:53 AM.)

#### CERTIFICATION OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

I, THERESA J. CASAL, RPR, CRR, CSR, Official
Realtime Court Reporter, in and for the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York, do
hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28,
United States Code, that the foregoing is a true and correct
transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held
in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page
format is in conformance with the regulations of the
Judicial Conference of the United States.

Dated this 25th day of September, 2019.

### /s/ THERESA J. CASAL

THERESA J. CASAL, RPR, CRR, CSR FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER